

AD 697.668

TRANSNATIONAL WORKING GROUP ON THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT

TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 4

(Covering activities of the period
March 1, 1969 through August 31, 1969)

Sponsored by

Advanced Research Projects Agency
ARPA Order No. 1085

Monitored by

Office of Naval Research under Contract N00014-67-A-0111-0013

Contract with

University of California, Los Angeles
Principal Investigator: Harold H. Kelley
Department of Psychology

Reproduced by the
CLEARINGHOUSE
for Federal Scientific & Technical
Information Springfield Va. 22151

Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose
of the United States Government.

This document has been approved for public release and sale;
its distribution is unlimited.

DDC
RECEIVED
DEC 4 1969
RECEIVED
B

SUMMARY

This report summarizes the joint research activities of thirteen experimental social psychologists, from U.S. and European universities, who are informally organized to plan and conduct studies on conflict between individuals and groups. New results are reported on several topics.

(1) Interpersonal bargaining. Subjects are found to use different dimensions in deciding how to orient themselves to an interpersonal bargaining relationship, either an evaluative dimension (the decision being whether to be honest and peaceful or dishonest and hostile), or a dynamism dimension (the decision being whether to be weak and passive or strong and active). The dimension used in different samples is found to be related in a systematic way to bargaining behavior and outcomes, and to affect the variations in behavior produced by variations in the importance of the stakes involved in the negotiation.

(2) The basis of ingroup-outgroup conflict. Preferential behavior toward the ingroup is found to occur even when the ingroup-outgroup distinction is made in minimal terms (e.g., different judgmental tendencies). New experiments are mildly contradictory with the original ones and raise questions about how salient the ingroup-outgroup distinction must be in order to produce the ingroup-favoritism effect.

(3) The effect of within-group relations upon intergroup relations. A number of new experiments are reported bearing on the general hypothesis that derogation of the outgroup will develop within a group to a greater extent if there is moderate conflict within that group than if there is no conflict. Some experiments provide confirming evidence and some, contradictory evidence. Suggestions are given as to the conditions necessary for ingroup conflict to be deflected toward hostility toward the outgroup.

1. Research on information acquisition under conflict.

The members who have worked on this topic are Flament, Kelley, Lanzetta, Nuttin and Tajfel. No further progress on this research is to be reported for the present period.

2. "International" bargaining experiment.

The research on bargaining has been conducted by Kelley, Shure, Deutsch, Faucheux, Lanzetta, Moscovici, Nuttin, Rabbie and Thibaut. The procedure for this study, conducted in eight different laboratories in the U.S. and Europe, has been described in Technical Report No. 1, and the main results in each of the preceding reports. Further analysis has been made of the data during the present reporting period, with a discussion of their implications by a subgroup (Shure, Faucheux, Kelley) in Los Angeles in May. A nearly-complete second draft of the report of the study has been written. This draft is attached to this report.

(a) The effects of high and low incentives at different sites. The major new findings resulting from the further analysis have to do with the effects of level of incentives (importance of the stakes) upon bargaining behavior in different samples of subjects at the different laboratories. As reported earlier, Gerald Shure and John Barefoot discovered by factor analytic techniques that the meaning of "cooperation-competition" varies among the several sites. In some cases, as in the Paris, Louvain and Dartmouth samples, it is defined primarily in evaluative terms (hostile-peaceful, moral-immoral, etc.). In other cases (at Columbia University, University of North Carolina, and UCLA) cooperation-competition is defined mainly in dynamic terms (passive-active, weak-strong). As noted earlier, this finding was regarded as of great potential importance, inasmuch as negotiators' self-ratings on the "cooperation-competition" scale are usually very good predictors of the course of the bargaining.

To pursue the implications of these different connotations of "cooperation-competition", we have combined the data for the three "evaluative" sites and compared them with the combined data for the three "dynamic" sites. An example of the results of this analysis is shown in Figure 1. In each subsample (the E or evaluative and D or dynamic samples), the effects of high and low incentives (money vs. points) on rate of agreement are shown for (1) pairs in which both members initially rated themselves highly cooperative, (2) pairs with intermediate or mixed cooperative ratings, and (3) pairs in which both members rated themselves highly competitive. It can be seen that generally (a) the effect of the money incentive is to increase the rate of agreement and (b) the rate is generally higher for cooperative than for competitive pairs. The major departures from these trends occur in the E sample in which (a) the money incentive does not increase the agreement rate for competitive pairs and (b) under the low incentive (points), the cooperative pairs are no more likely to agree than the competitive ones.

The details of these results are described in the attached, second draft of the paper "An experimental-comparative study of negotiation behavior" by Kelley, Shure, et al. They can be summarized as follows: (1) Bargainers in the D samples tend to describe the bargaining situation in "task" or "instrumental" terms. They treat the negotiation problems as tasks to be solved by directly arranged allocational rules, and not, like their E counterparts, as interactions having wider, moral connotations. (2) The money incentive tends to shift all subjects, even those in the E sample, toward an instrumental definition. This is supported by further factor analysis and by the patterns of bargaining behavior in the two samples under money vs. point incentives. (3) Competitive subjects of the two types are difficult to distinguish in terms of patterns of bargaining behavior, but the D-type competitors are highly responsive to the monetary incentive. (4) The difficulties encountered by E-type cooperators under the low incentive and the lack of improvement of E-type competitors when the money incentive is introduced -- both these facts suggest that the moralistic definition of the bargaining relationship interferes with optimal accommodation within it.

3. The basis of ingroup-outgroup conflict.

During the past six months, Tajfel has extended his work on the basis of preferential behavior toward one's own group (the ingroup) as opposed to another group (the outgroup). Also, Deutsch has conducted a series of studies deriving from Tajfel's work and using variants of his procedures.

In Tajfel's new work, he finds further evidence from the ingroup preference under minimal conditions: (a) within a class of 15-16 year olds, exactly which individuals belong to the ingroup and which, to the outgroup are unknown; (b) there is no special interaction within groups as compared to between groups; and (c) the group has no instrumental value, it is simply a set of youngsters all of whom are alleged to have the same judgmental tendency.

In the early experiment, this was a tendency (1) to be accurate vs. inaccurate or (2) to overestimate or underestimate quantities. In the recent study, it is a tendency to have one or another aesthetic preference. In all cases, the assignment of youngsters to groups is controlled so that they are not really different in judgmental tendencies but are only alleged to be so.

By virtue of some logical analysis made by Flament of the choices given the youngsters as a means of expressing their ingroup preferences, Tajfel has been able to assess the relative strength of several tendencies in these choices. In all cases, the choices are made among different pairs of payoffs (of points representing money) for the ingroup and outgroup. Tajfel's data suggest that the strongest tendency is to win or maximize the difference between own group's and other group's payoffs. The next strongest is the tendency to maximize the payoff to own group regardless of what the other group receives. Then of lesser strength (and unclear as to their relative significance) are tendencies to maximize the total payoff to the two groups, to maximize the payoff to the other group, and to maintain a fair (equal) division between the two groups.

Deutsch's first experiments also grouped the boys according to whether they (allegedly) underestimated or overestimated a quantity. However, no mention was made of "group membership" at the time the payoff decisions were made. Under these conditions, there is no evidence of an ingroup favoritism, even though it can be shown that the youngsters can recall which category each other belongs to (whether under- or over-estimator) when making the allocations between boys in the two categories. With a more evaluative criterion of classification (accurate vs. inaccurate), Deutsch finds some evidence of ingroup preference. With more sophisticated subjects (college students), even this favoritism effect disappears.

Deutsch also studied the case where the choice involves not an allocation of resources between ingroup and outgroup, but rather a choice of partner to work with on the next task. The evidence to date indicates that these explicitly instrumental choices are guided by highly rational considerations (e.g., under-estimators choose overestimators) rather than simple similarity. Deutsch speculates that even the similarity (ingroup) choices found by Tajfel may reflect learned generalizations from situations in which similarity provides a cue or basis for behavioral coordination (i.e., in which similarity choices have instrumental value).

4. The effect of within-group relations upon intergroup relations.

A subgroup comprised of Thibaut, Rabbie and Lanzetta met in North Carolina in April to discuss and make plans in this area, and then Rabbie met with Pruitt in Buffalo to plan further joint work.

Subsequently Rabbie has completed at Utrecht the experiment that he and Thibaut had planned in March 1968 and piloted that spring and summer. The major experimental variable is homogeneity vs. heterogeneity of attitudes within a group as this affects attitudes toward ingroup and outgroup. Rabbie's results confirm Thibaut's pilot results from North Carolina. In the situation represented in this experiment, the effect of attitudinal heterogeneity within the group is to reduce the evaluative preferences members show for it over a competing outgroup, and to scale down the minimum position the members set for themselves in negotiating with the outgroup. This experiment also has interesting data on the reactions of an outvoted minority to the prospect of negotiations with the competing group, and the development of belief systems in the context of initial agreement or disagreement. Rabbie is in the process of writing a report on the results from his and Thibaut's studies.

Rabbie and Pruitt have also designed and conducted studies that deal with internal conflict as it affects relations with an outgroup. Their hypothesis is that with a moderate degree of internal conflict, in an effort to control the resulting divisive tendencies, the group will tend to build up a negative image of the outgroup (as a threatening enemy).

This will not occur under low internal conflict, and with high conflict, the group will be unable to act effectively to generate outgroup derogation.

Internal analysis of Rabbie's earlier experiment on homogeneity vs. heterogeneity of internal attitudes as they affect attitudes toward a cooperating or competing outgroup, yielded results consistent with this hypothesis. Attitudes toward the competitive outgroup were more negative with internal heterogeneity than with internal homogeneity. (This is contrary to his and Thibaut's later results, described above at the beginning of this section.) Rabbie has now designed and run a new study (8 groups per cell in a 2X2 design) which also yields evidence consistent with the hypothesis. With heterogeneity of opinion within the ingroup, there appears to be an increase in derogation of the competing outgroup. In contrast, homogeneity of attitude leads to heightened approval of the ingroup when there is competition with the outgroup (as compared with there being cooperative relations with the outer group).

Pruitt has tested the same hypothesis with a different procedure (8 subjects per cell in a 2X2 design). Although he is able successfully to manipulate the necessary independent variables (homogeneity of attitudes within the group and cooperative-competitive relation with the outgroup), he finds no confirmation of the derogation hypothesis.

Thibaut has suggested that the crucial factor mediating the relation between ingroup conflict and outgroup derogation is that there be a history of exploitation of a subgroup of the ingroup, which subgroup then threatens to defect. This threat to internal solidarity can only be met fully by derogation of the outgroup. Thibaut has designed and conducted an experiment to test this idea of the "instrumental magnification of external threat in order to moderate and control internal dissension". The investigation involves a role-playing or simulation procedure in which the subject gives advice to the leader of a country as to the types of persuasive arguments to address to a mistreated minority group in that country to induce them to maintain their loyalty and resist defecting to a competing hostile country. With 12 groups in each cell of a 2X2 design, the results support the hypothesis: when the subgroup has been treated unfairly, the appeals directed to them are more often derogatory of the outgroup and, moreover, the same derogation tendency is manifested in the subjects' judgments of the outgroup.

These various studies in the conditions favoring the development of outgroup derogation and antagonism are conflicting in their results. A major problem for the future is to identify more clearly the conditions that favor this development and those that inhibit it. Alternatively, the problem is to investigate more thoroughly the consequences of ingroup divisiveness in order to determine when the conflict is disruptive of that group and when, in contrast, it results in an ultimate strengthening of the group as through stimulating the development of a unifying conception of a common external threat.

5. Cumberland Lodge Meeting

Ten members of the Working Group met from July 18 to July 24, 1969 at Cumberland Lodge, the Royal Park, Windsor, England. We devoted four half-days to discussions of the topics outlined above, two half-days to general discussions of theory and methods in the experimental study of conflict, two half-days to the consideration of our Group's plans and procedures, and four half-days to reports and discussion of individual members' research.